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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the way in which Husserl’s transcendental idealism reverses the 
thesis stemming from the naturalistic worldview, according to which the existence of 
humanity in the universe is a contingent fact. It will appear that the resulting 
teleological account of the world history does not interfere with the traditional 
explanations provided by the empirical sciences and that it is a consequence of the 
teleology inbuilt in the correlation between transcendental subjectivity and the world. 
The conclusion is reached by analyzing some of Husserl’s text concerning the 
transcendental role of embodiment and normality.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The gradual development of natural sciences over the past four centuries has 
bequeathed to us a worldview that hinges on a grand narrative beginning with 
the origin of the universe, and comprising a number a successive stages 
culminating with the birth of life on our planet and, ultimately, with the rise of 
human intelligence. Such narrative, which is based on the joint results of physics, 
astronomy, chemistry, biology, and paleontology, has shaped our civilization 
probably more decisively than any other cultural transformation occurred in the 
modern era. It has provided the general framework in which our existence finds 
its place, and it has pervaded, often in implicit ways, our attitude towards human 
history and its meaning and value. Crucial to such world narrative is the rejection 
of final causes that marked the development of modern science, which initially 
associated with the rise of mathematical physics, finally led to the Darwinian, 
anti-teleological account of the origin of life and of its evolution up to us. 
Mathematical physics and evolutionary biology are indeed its lasting 
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cornerstones, fostering a persistent naturalistic understanding also of the 
aspects of human life that appear, at first sight, more remote from the concerns 
of natural scientists. The recent achievements of neuroscience have 
strengthened its convincingness to an even higher degree. 
It has often been claimed that the common motive unifying most of the 
scientific accomplishments of the modern era consists in a progressive de-
centering of human existence and in its reinterpretation as a contingent 
emergence at the periphery of the universe. The opposition to such worldview 
has been fierce, and constantly renews itself in various forms; but it has only 
marginally affected its predominance. In particular, the role that our anti-
teleological worldview seems to assign to blind chance deserves our attention. 
The realistic-naturalistic worldview underlying the scientific conception of 
reality and of the place of humankind in it rests not only on factual claims, such 
as that the universe existed long before the appearance of humans and of any 
other living being, not only on conditional claims, such as that the universe 
would continue to exist even if any human and animals disappeared, but also on 
a number of counterfactual scenarios. Indeed, all scientifically educated people 
would take as an obvious consequence of the scientific worldview that had the 
physical conditions of the universe been different, life would have never 
appeared, that, further, had the physical and biological conditions on the Earth 
or, perhaps, elsewhere too been different, no intelligent life would have 
developed, and that, finally, had the physical, biological and historical 
conditions been different, no scientific and philosophical civilization would have 
ever seen the light of the day. These counterfactual statements are woven into 
the naturalistic worldview precisely because they are taken to highlight that 
consciousness in general, and human consciousness in particular, is not only a 
limited phenomenon within the world, but also a wholly accidental one.1 
One of the most vehement advocates of this worldview, the biologist Jacques 
Monod, has stressed the disquieting character of the role that chance plays in it: 
 
When one ponders on the tremendous journey of evolution over the past three 
billion years or so, the prodigious wealth of structures it has engendered, and 
 
1 This complicity between naturalism and the thesis of the contingency of natural history is absent in the 
sophisticated version of naturalism proposed by Quine, who tends to eschew counterfactual statements 
from the language of science. The resulting worldview ascribes nonetheless to us a wholly marginal role 
in the order of things. As is well known, according to Quine: «Physics investigates the essential nature 
of the world, and biology describes a local bump. Psychology, human psychology, describes a bump on 
the bump.» (Quine, 1981, p. 93). 
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the extraordinarily effective teleonomic performances of living beings, from 
bacteria to man, one may well find oneself beginning to doubt again whether all 
this could conceivably be the product of an enormous lottery presided over by 
natural selection, blindly picking the rare winners from among numbers drawn 
at utter random. 
While one’s conviction may be restored by a detailed view of the accumulated 
modern evidence that this conception alone is compatible with the facts 
(notably with the molecular mechanisms of replication, mutation, and 
translation), it affords no synthetic, intuitive, and immediate grasp of the vast 
sweep of evolution. The miracle stands “explained”; it does not strike us as any 
less miraculous. (Monod, 1971, p. 138)2 
 
It is not surprising that within the field of philosophy of mind, which, over 
the past decades, has struggled with the problem of finding a place for mind, 
consciousness and human culture within the naturalistic worldview,3 some have 
felt the need to reconsider the rejection of teleology that characterizes modern 
science. For instance, Thomas Nagel, who can be considered as an unhappy 
naturalist, waging against naturalism a lifelong “war from within”, has recently 
argued that a correct account of the mind, one involving consciousness, reason, 
and the ability to grasp values, makes it almost impossible for the materialist 
neo-Darwinian view of evolution to explain how the mind originated from a 
material world governed by the laws of physics. According to him, the miracle 
does not stand explained. Nagel ventures to suggest that, in order to overcome 
this difficulty, scientific explanation might have to change in such a way as to 
accommodate a form of teleological account. Such account would imply a 
significant revision of the scientific conception of nature. In virtue of such 
revision, the laws of nature would only set probabilistic constraints on the 
evolution of physical systems, while properly teleological laws would increase 
the probability of the specific outcomes of natural processes that are endowed 
with a higher value. In other words, teleological laws would fill the gaps left open 
by the laws of physics by orientating evolution towards a more meaningful future 
state of the world.4    
 
2  See also his programmatic dismissal of teleology: «The cornerstone of the scientific method is the 
postulate that nature is objective. In other words, the systematic denial that ‘true’ knowledge can be got at 
by interpreting phenomena in terms of final causes - that is to say, of ‘purpose’» (Monod, 1971, p. 21). 
3 For such overall characterization of the predominant motivation of contemporary philosophers of 
mind, see, for instance, Kim (1998, p. 2), and Searle (2000, p. 89). 
4 Nagel, 2012, p. 91-93. 
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This is not the place to discuss either the plausibility or the internal 
coherence of such a proposal, which Nagel himself seems to consider little more 
than a possibility worthy of consideration, given what he sees as the current 
hopelessly unsatisfactory state of science. It is useful, however, to mention it 
before exploring some of the aspects of Husserl’s views about teleology, 
precisely because, as we shall shortly see, Husserl aims at reintroducing 
teleological considerations in our worldview, without interfering in the least 
with the explanations of natural science. In what follows, I will outline how 
Husserl’s transcendental idealism implies a reversal of the naturalistic worldview 
also concerning the role that the latter assigns to blind chance. The resulting 
picture will highlight the radical opposition existing between transcendental 
phenomenology and philosophy of mind (both in its mainstream form and in the 
deviant version suggested by Nagel). Furthermore, it will provide a clear 
example of how one of Husserl’s chief aims consisted in elaborating a 
reinterpretation of the scientific results that, while not interfering with them, 
would pave the way to a new rationalistic worldview, in which the primacy of 
humanity is reestablished.  
 
2. The teleology of consciousness and the teleology of world history 
The first systematic presentation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in Ideas I 
contains only a few sparse references to the notion of teleology and, as is often 
the case, in close connection to the problem of God. It is appropriate, however, 
to begin this analysis from this work, because in it, in a very succinct way, 
Husserl introduces the general notions that help us frame the relation between 
transcendental idealism and teleology. In Chapter Four of Ideas I, Husserl 
pursues the attempt of circumscribing the nature and scope of the 
phenomenological reduction, previously introduced as the suspension of the 
transcendence of the world of the natural attitude. In § 58, the transcendence of 
God is suspended, which Husserl had characterized in § 51 as radically different 
from the transcendence of the world and “absolute” in a sense other than that in 
which transcendental consciousness is said to be “absolute”. 5  Before 
announcing that the phenomenologist should refrain from using any judgment 
implying the existence of God, Husserl hints at the reasons that might motivate 
the positing of such peculiar transcendence. At this point, he mentions two 
groups of teleological reasons. Let us consider them in turn: 
 
5 Husserl, 1983, p. 116-117. 
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Reduction of the natural world to the absolute of consciousness yields factual 
concatenations of mental processes of consciousness of certain kinds with 
distinctive regular orders in which a morphologically ordered world in the 
sphere of empirical intuition becomes constituted as their intentional correlate, 
i.e., a world concerning which there can be classifying and describing sciences. 
At the same time precisely this world, with respect to the material lower level, 
admits of becoming determined in the theoretical thinking of the mathematical 
natural sciences as the “appearance” of a Nature as determined by physics, 
subject to laws of Nature which are exact. In all this, since the rationality made 
actual by the fact is not a rationality demanded by the essence, there is a 
marvelous teleology. (Husserl, 1983, p. 134) 
 
In order to unpack this dense passage, it is necessary to recall some key-ideas 
of the Fundamental Phenomenological Consideration, the central section of 
Ideas I. The eidetic analysis of consciousness contained in it aims to open up the 
objective domain of transcendental phenomenology as the eidetic science of 
transcendental consciousness. The dualism of fact and essence is crucial to this 
effort: on the one hand, there is the essence of consciousness in general, and, 
on the other, its factual instantiations in the Erlebnisse of a given stream of 
consciousness. All the entities that happen to exist in the factually existing world 
are the correlates of such factual instantiations and, in the transcendental 
attitude, they are reduced to so many pure phenomena for the 
phenomenologically reduced subject. Husserl had already highlighted in § 47 
that the constitution of the world is a contingent fact (as against the eidetic 
necessity governing the how of its constitution), by introducing the famous 
mental experiment of the dismantling of the world, the so-called 
“Weltvernichtung”, whose aim was to show that the being of consciousness 
would remain unaffected even in the extreme scenario under which a generalized 
discordance between Erlebnisse prevented the stable constitution of any 
objective correlate of consciousness. This is not only valid for the individual 
objects of our experience, such as a table or a tree, but also for the entire 
constitutive layers that a scientifically determinable, objective world must 
necessarily comprise in order to exist. Two such layers (comprising in turn 
several superimposed sublayers) are fundamental to the being of an objective 
nature: the level of nature as it is given in perceptual experience, and the level of 
nature as it is determined by mathematical physics. The constitutive analysis 
shows that, when mathematical physics describes natural entities and processes 
in terms of mathematical concepts and magnitudes, it elaborates higher order 
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transcendent units replacing the objects of direct experience and assuring the 
ultimate objectivity of material nature.6 The first level of natural objectivity is the 
“morphologically ordered” domain that Husserl mentions in the passage above, 
and that the describing and classifying sciences of nature, such as botany and 
zoology, investigate. The higher order level of natural objectivity, instead, is the 
correlate of the idealizing, mathematical natural sciences.7 Now, the dismantling 
of objectivity in thought envisaged in the mental experiment of the “destruction 
of the world” highlights that there is no eidetic necessity for a morphologically 
ordered nature to be also determinable in exact physico-mathematical terms. 
Indeed, Husserl envisages, as a first step in the destruction of objectivity in 
thought, that the world of experience, while existing and manifesting a 
morphological order, could be such that it does not admit of any objective, exact 
physical determinations. 8  The result of this analysis is that, once we have 
reduced the world to absolute consciousness, we realize that the factual 
concatenations of Erlebnisse are such that they constitute, in virtue of a 
contingent concordance, synthetic unities of different degrees, i.e., they 
constitute a world as a rational totality. The appearance of ordinary perceptual 
objects is contingent upon the harmonious syntheses that take place in 
perception, and constantly at threat of being cancelled out by future experience. 
This is, already by itself, a fact worthy of wonder; but no less startling is the fact 
that such morphological order manifests, “behind it”, an exact nomological 
order. 
This double, factual, contingent rationality of the world as it constantly 
constitutes itself in transcendental consciousness is what Husserl here 
characterizes as a “marvelous teleology” pointing to the possible existence of a 
supreme source of such teleology, namely God.9 Setting aside the theological 
implications that Husserl is trying to work out, and which would in turn require 
the practical-axiological reconsideration of the world, it is at this stage 
important to understand the sense in which Husserl connects the rationality of 
the factually constituted world to the notion of teleology. Now, for Husserl, true 
being is always the correlate of reason intended not as: «… an accidental de facto 
ability, not a title for possible accidental matters of fact, but rather a title for an 
all-embracing essentially necessary structural form belonging to all 
 
6 See Husserl, 1983, §§ 40 and 52. 
7 For a more detailed analysis of morphological and exact-idealizing sciences (see Husserl, 1983, §§ 72-74). 
8Husserl,1983, p. 104. 
9 For an analysis of the theological implications of the teleology of consciousness, see (Held, 2010). 
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transcendental subjectivity.» (Husserl, 1960, p. 57). To the eidetic structure of 
rational consciousness, there correspond the possibility of the appearance of true 
factual being. The rationality of the fact is precisely its being an objective pole 
attested in the objectifying structures of consciousness. Why, then, does such 
contingent, rational, objective poles deserve to be ranked under the heading of 
teleology? To appreciate this point, it is necessary to recall the basic elements of 
the theory of constitution, at least in its simplest form, i.e., the one involving 
perceptual consciousness only. In each act of perception, an object is given only 
one-sidedly, and yet grasped not as a profile, but as a full-blown object. This means 
that to each act of perception, there corresponds a horizon of possible concordant 
perceptions of the same object that are emptily anticipated in the actual state of 
perception. The future course of experience can confirm that the object exists and 
is such as it has been anticipated, or else it can produce a collapse of concordance. 
In other terms, an act of perception can intend a transcendent object only insofar 
as it has an anticipative structure that can find fulfilment in the subsequent course 
of the experience of that object. The intentionality of consciousness, the intending 
of an object, is, thus, connected to a system of possible perceptions in which the 
existence of the object is given with evidence. In a sense, the being of a 
transcendent object sets a task for consciousness, the task of confirming its 
existence in virtue of the character of evidence that pertaining to all possible 
perceptions of that object. This is, in outline, what Husserl has in mind when he 
speaks of the object grasped by an intentional act as a telos for the life of 
consciousness. 10  The posits of experience are, thus, related to an internal 
teleology of the life of the subject, whereby the subject is, so to speak, constantly 
“thirsty” for further evidence confirming their existence and progressively 
revealing their being so and so. This remains true, even if, in fact, the subject will 
not endlessly pursue this progressive concatenation of perceptions. 
 
10 Husserl explains this point in several passages. I provide here some examples. «Und so wird die 
Methode der Konstitution schließlich zur allgemeinen Methode der gesamten Phänomenologie; aus 
keinem anderen Grunde, weil die teleologische Konstitution des Bewusstseins (das ist der möglichen 
Zusammenhänge einzelnen Bewusstseins, mit denen sich Gegenständliches konstituieren kann) es so 
fordert.» (Hua 3/2, p. 549). «…das Wesen der transzendentalen Subjektivität und ihre 
Wesensgesetzmassigkeit durch und durch teleologisch ist. » (Hua 9, p. 254). «Das Ding ist seinem 
Wesen nach nichts anderes als etwas, das unter den Umständen so und unter anderen anders und dann 
gerade so ‚aussieht‘ und im Wechsel des Aussehens unter der Idee eines X von Eigenschaften steht, das 
im Prozess der möglichen Erkenntnis das Telos ist, das immer vollkommener in immer besserer 
Annäherung erreicht werden kann, in immer vollkommeneren Ansätzen. » (Hua 14, p. 248). 
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What is true at the level of ordinary perception is true also for the higher-
level intentional correlates of empirical science. To each scientific truth, there 
corresponds a multi-layered system of intentional activities, in which it 
constitutes itself, beginning with the level of ordinary perception and ending in 
the experimental and theoretical activities of science. Each such object is the 
telos of an infinite system of possible evident verifications that, in the case of 
science, becomes also the conscious aim of an endless determination. In sum, 
the fact that factual course of intentional acts belonging to the stream of 
consciousness is not a chaos of “adumbrations”, but a synthetic unity in which a 
scientifically terminable world is constantly constituted reveals the teleology of 
consciousness in the above-specified sense.  
We can now turn to the second group of teleological considerations that 
Husserl mentions immediately after the above quoted passage: 
Furthermore: The systematic exploration of all teleologies to be found in the 
empirical world itself, for example the factual evolution of the sequence of 
organisms as far as human being and, in the development of mankind, the 
growth of culture with its spiritual treasures, is not yet completed with the 
natural-scientific explanation of all such produced formations as coming from 
the given factual circumstances and according to the laws of Nature. Rather, the 
transition to pure consciousness by the method of transcendental reduction 
leads necessarily to the question about the ground for the now-emerging 
factualness of the corresponding constitutive consciousness. Not the fact as 
such, but the fact as source of endlessly increasing value-possibilities and 
values-actualities forces the question into one about the “ground” – which 
naturally does not have the sense of a physical-causal reason.(Husserl, 1983, p. 
134) 
The first part of this passage refers to the universal history that, starting from 
the first living organisms leads to the rise of humanity and to the development of 
civilization and to is “spiritual treasures”, among which, let us recall it, science 
constitutes, for Husserl, the highest of all. It is, at bottom, the world narrative 
characterizing modernity that we have already encountered at the beginning of 
this study, supplemented by a final part about the birth and development of 
human civilization. Let us call it world history. The fact that Husserl speaks here 
about “teleologies” might make the reader wonder whether he is endorsing 
some kind of teleological scientific explanation of such a history, one that would 
be at odds with the modern methods of physics, evolutionary biology, and of the 
social sciences. However, this is not at all the case. As Husserl clearly states, the 
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scientific explanation of such “evolution” is based, at least for the part 
concerning nature, on the “given factual circumstances” and on the “laws of 
nature”.  In other words, empirical sciences have the task to explain what has in 
fact happened according to their own methods, which will be causal-nomological 
in the case of the sciences of nature, and “motivational” in the case of the 
“sciences of spirit”. Husserl never believed that the teleological reconsideration 
of empirical facts must interfere with the explanation of the sciences, although 
he believed that human sciences cannot be reduced to the natural sciences and 
that they must make use of notions such as aim and motivation.11 Rather, Husserl 
is convinced that, once the empirical sciences have explained the fact of this 
evolution towards the present state of affairs with their own methods, there 
remains room for its teleological reconsideration, based on the transcendental 
fact of the absolute consciousness constituting them. Once the world history is 
reduced to the corresponding transcendental facticity of certain concatenations 
of Erlebnisse, one has reached the ground on which one can ask the question 
about its teleological source. The question is now “for the sake of which that 
happened” and not “why?”. This reconsideration involves, therefore, questions 
of values and not only of fact. This open tendency towards higher and higher 
“value-possibilities” is, once more, a motivation for the constitution of the 
transcendence of God as the source as such teleology, which, as already said, is 
not the line of inquiry pursued in this study.  
In conclusion, if we extract from § 58 the teleological notions there 
presented, without focusing of how they point to an ultimate teleological source, 
we confront the following situation. The de facto concatenation of intentional 
Erlebnisse in the absolute consciousness is such that it, so to speak, “carries 
within it” two “marvelous” teleologies. On the one hand, we find the very fact 
that the world is scientifically determinable ad infinitum, i.e., it is the ideal pole, 
the telos, of an infinite process of knowledge. It is, first, morphologically 
structured in ordinary inanimate objects and living organisms, including human 
beings. In addition, the material layer of the morphological nature given in 
perception appears only as the manifestation of the fully objectified world 
described by physics, governed by exact physical laws. On the other hand, we 
find in absolute consciousness the concatenations of lived experiences 
corresponding to the fact that such world has an internal history, an internal 
developmental process that from inanimate matter has led to the emergence of 
 
11 Husserl, 1989, § 56. 
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life, humanity, and civilization. At both levels, what is in question here is 
“transcendental facticity” i.e., a component of absolute consciousness. Still, 
while in the first case we observe the very fact that the world constitutes itself as 
an objectively determinable nature, i.e., we observe the occurrence of the 
syntheses that make this objective determination possible, in the second case, 
we witness the existence of a certain number of facts within the 
phenomenologically reduced world, namely that there is an evolutionary process 
that from inanimate matter leads to human civilization. It is this second fact that 
rises immediately a question connecting Husserl’s thought with the scientific 
common sense view of the world history: to what extent and on what basis can 
we claim that such ascending process was necessary? If we do not yet take into 
account questions of value, and we omit any considerations concerning the 
possible teleological source of this developmental process, can we say anything 
about its being, in some sense, goal-directed? As we shall see in the next section, 
the first teleology, the teleology inbuilt in the very existence of a scientifically 
knowable true-world-in-itself, the teleology of consciousness, provides the key 
to answer this question and to cast a different light on the entire scientific world 
narrative.  
 
3. An overview of the transcendental role of embodiment and normality 
In order to answer this question with the resources of phenomenology, it is 
necessary to overcome the somewhat simplified exposition of transcendental 
idealism that is contained in Ideas I. In particular, one needs to take into account 
the role that the living body (“Leib”) and intersubjectivity play in the 
constitution of the world. In Ideas I, especially in the Fundamental 
Phenomenological Consideration, Husserl only hinted at these themes, simply 
because his aim was a preliminary one, namely to clarify the difference between 
the immanent being of transcendental consciousness and the transcendent 
being of the world, which is relative to the former. Indeed, Husserl has been 
rightly credited with reforming the very notion of transcendental philosophy in 
such a way that the themes of embodiment and intersubjectivity become central 
to it. Yet, these themes did not hold center stage in the first volume of Ideas, due 
to the introductory character of that work. In his Nachwort to Ideas, Husserl, 
reasserting the validity of the conclusions of his earlier, so vociferously criticized 
book, characterizes it as: «The first preliminary beginning of a new conception 
of the transcendental problem» (Husserl, 1989, p. 419). The transcendental 
problem in question consists in the task of elucidating the sense of this world, 
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more specifically, the sense of its being. The being, the real existence of the 
world, lies beyond doubt, but the foundation of its legitimacy can become 
thematic only in the specific artificial attitude called transcendental. The eidetic 
constitutive analyses carried out in this attitude reveal that the being of each 
entity belonging to any ontological region is a sense constituted in 
transcendental subjectivity in virtue of the syntheses operated in its intentional 
performances. 
 
The result of the phenomenological sense-clarification of the mode of being of 
the real world, and of any conceivable real world at all, is that only the being of 
transcendental subjectivity has the sense of absolute being, that only it is 
“irrelative” (i.e., relative only to itself) whereas the real world indeed has an 
essential relativity to transcendental subjectivity, due, namely, to the fact that it 
can have its sense as being only as an intentional sense-formation of 
transcendental subjectivity.(Husserl, 1989, p. 420) 
 
The central thesis of Husserl’s transcendental or phenomenological idealism 
is contained in this sentence, i.e., the claim that the world is a unit of sense in 
transcendental subjectivity. Indeed: «…transcendental phenomenology, as a 
concrete science, is itself universal idealism carried out as science…» (Husserl, 
1989, p. 419-420). However, these formulations acquire their real meaning 
only once the self-explication of the absolute Ego, the pure Ego of the 
transcendentally purified lived experiences, reveals that such Ego constitutes 
the world only qua member of an open community of transcendental subjects 
that co-function with it, and are implicated in its being, in a word, only when the 
real word-constituting subjectivity appears to be transcendental 
intersubjectivity, and phenomenology becomes a transcendental 
phenomenological monadology. Thus, characterized, phenomenological 
idealism relativizes the being of the world to transcendental subjectivity, 
because such being is contingent upon the concordance of the constituting 
experiences of an open community of transcendental subjects. Transcendental, 
thus, means, in the first place: «concerning the consciousness-relative sense of 
being of the transcendent»(Hua 9, p. 289), although, in virtue of the self-
reflectivity and irrelativity of constituting subjectivity, the term naturally 
extends to what concerns the self-constitution of transcendental subjectivity 
itself and of its ultimate sense of being. 
Husserl never tires of demarcating his transcendental idealism from what he 
terms the classical idealism represented by Berkeley, Leibnitz and Hume, and, a 
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fortiori, from the most naive versions of psychological idealism (which, 
according to him, classical idealists indeed had already, at least to an extent, 
overcome). We find a succinct characterization of the latter form of idealism in 
the following passage: 
As long as one knows only of psychological subjectivity, posits it as absolute, 
and yet would explain the world as the mere correlate of this subjectivity, then 
idealism will be countersensical, will be psychological idealism – the one 
opposed by an equally countersensical realism.(Husserl 1989, p. 421) 
Psychological subjectivity is subjectivity qua human or animal, i.e., 
consciousness apperceived as annexed to human or animal living-bodies, thus, 
consciousness posited in the natural attitude as a situated component of the 
spatiotemporal world. Any doctrine that turns the world itself into a being 
relative to psychological subjectivity is a form of psychological idealism. In light 
of Husserl’s characterization of the transcendental problem, such doctrines are 
countersensical, because psychological subjectivity is already a constituted unit 
of sense belonging to the world, in other words, it is already a relative being that 
presupposes the sense “world”. The being of the world, the way in which it 
legitimizes itself as the true world, cannot rest on one of its components.12 
As is well known, the fact that transcendental subjectivity is not embodied 
human or animal subjectivity does not mean that the living body does not play a 
role, and a fundamental one, in the transcendental constitution of the world. On 
the contrary, the constitutional analyses can be carried out without mentioning 
the living body only in an abstract form, or, as Husserl said, in the “self-
forgetfulness” of what actually constituting subjectivity is. 13 Recall that each 
perception involves two types of sensations. Changes in kinaesthetic sensations 
motivate changes in the sensations that undergo objective apprehension. They 
also motivate the apprehension itself.  Kinaesthetic sensations are connected in 
an essential way to the horizon of potential perceptions surrounding any given 
perception of a transcendent object, because the progressive explication of the 
horizon takes place as a continuous series of perceptions motivated in turn by 
continuous series of such sensations. As these kinaesthetic sensations, by 
themselves, cannot undergo any objective apprehension, they themselves 
 
12 The criticism of this countersense is ubiquitous in Husserl’s work, for it often serves the purpose of 
illustrating how the authentic formulation of the problem of knowledge cannot be given in the natural 
attitude, but demands the suspension of the world-positing apperceptions. In the natural attitude, the 
problem of knowledge can be formulated only in an “anthropological way”. 
13 (Husserl 1989, p. 60). 
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acquire only indirectly the sense of something transcendent, namely through a 
process of localization in the living body that is essentially parallel to the 
localization of the fields of sensation themselves. The Leib as the bearer of my 
subjective life emerges in virtue of a peculiar synthesis: the localization of 
kinaesthetic sensations in what will become actual parts of the Leib (limbs, eyes, 
etc.) is motivated by the mutual perception of the different sense organs. Thus, 
the fields of sensations can themselves be localized in ways that are specific to 
them, and the Leib appears as a unitary system of sense organs, or as the organ 
of perception. Now, there is little doubt that, already at the abstract level of 
solipsistic experience, the Leib is de facto involved in all perceptual life, as the 
freely moving system of the organs of perception and as the zero-point of spatial 
(and temporal) orientation.14     
 The Leib does not only play an essential role in the perceptual life of a 
“solipsistic subject”, but is also necessary for the constitution of the other 
subjects, i.e., for the constitution of intersubjectivity, and, correlatively, of the 
one objective world common to all. In transcendental terms, this means: if an 
objective world is to exist at all, there must be an open community of subjects in 
a relation of mutual understanding that co-constitute it, hence, these subjects 
 
14 The theory of constitution has to work out the eidos of the constitution of the world in transcendental 
subjectivity. Therefore, the following question cannot be avoided: “Can we imagine a world-
constituting disembodied subjectivity, or is there an eidetic law according to which no such constitution 
can ever take place?” The answer to this question is required by the eidetic character of the science of 
transcendental subjectivity. This question can of course be first addressed at the primordial level of 
solipsistic constitution. To be sure, the already mentioned mental experiment of the Weltvernichtung 
implies a fortiori what we could call a Leib-Vernichtung: if each transcendent objectivity cancels out as 
a result of a chaos of conflicting adumbrations, then the same fate befalls the living body. However, 
under this scenario, the resulting disembodied consciousness is also a worldless one, and, setting aside 
the controversy over whether such a mental experiment can be conducted to its radical endpoint, this 
conclusion does not help us answering the question concerning the possibility of a disembodied subject 
that is world constituting. Now, it appears that Husserl himself was torn by this question. In Ideas II, he 
sets it aside, while, in a short text written in 1927, he takes up the issue, and eventually seems to settle 
for a categorical statement that: 1) a Leibloses Subjeck is conceivable, and 2) it would be able to 
constitute the world, i.e., to possess hyletic data that undergo objective apprehension in correlation 
with motivating series of kinaesthetic data (Hua 14, p. 547). It is of course likely that the world 
constituted by such disembodied subjectivity, even within the abstraction imposed by the solipsistic 
approach, would be very impoverished, and would amount to a quasi-world, of the kind of those 
corresponding to the gradual destruction of objectivity envisaged in Ideas I. However, it is not necessary 
to pursue this question here, since the living body, playing a necessary role in any act of empathy, is a 
necessary presupposition of the intersubjective constitution of the world, as Husserl recalls at the end 
of this short text. 
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must be embodied. This is what Husserl tellingly calls the transcendental 
deduction of the Leib.15  In virtue of this first result, the being of the world 
necessarily implies the existence of a community of embodied subjects, or, seen 
from the transcendental point of view, in order for transcendental subjectivity to 
constitute the world, it must self-objectifies as a community of embodied 
subjects.  
These are the first and most fundamental roles that the living body plays in 
constitution, but by far not the only ones. As we shall soon see, embodiment is 
essential also for the highest level of constitution in virtue of which the world of 
experience is replaced by the fully objective world of mathematical physics. Yet, 
this second important step can be correctly framed only by taking into account 
Husserl’s analysis of the notions of normality and abnormality. 
The key to understand the phenomenological account of normality consists 
in acknowledging that it is a transcendental notion required by the constitution 
of the world.16 Let us first focus on the role of normality in the perceptual life of 
an individual subject. As we have seen, the objects of perception and their 
properties are constituted in virtue of the concordant progress of experience. 
Concordance between different Erlebnisse, let us stress it once more, is the 
fundamental condition for reality to be there at all. It is by reflecting on it that 
we realize that transcendent reality cannot be dissociated from the syntheses that 
take place in consciousness. Now, the role of the living body as the organ of 
perception introduces a further degree of complexity in the relation between 
what appears as real and the character of concordance. Let us, for instance, 
consider the way in which a blister on a finger modifies our tactile experience. 
In this case, there occurs a conflict between the tactile experience of the 
impaired finger and the tactile experience that we are used to and that, for 
instance, the other fingers still make possible. Similar situations arise when we cross 
the eyes, and, much more dramatically, when we ingest chemical substances that 
alter our perception in a radical way. In all such cases, we do not apprehend the 
changes in sensations as objective changes. Rather, we consider the “new” qualities 
as mere appearances of the normal ones. This fact suffices by itself to highlight that 
normality must play a necessary role in the constitution of the world, i.e., a 
transcendental role. Indeed, a subject unable to tell apart whether a breakdown of 
 
15 Hua 13, p. 375. 
16 As Joona Taipale puts it: «… phenomenology deals with normality as a transcendental, qualitative, 
and dynamic issue» (Taipale, 2014, p. 123-124). 
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concordance is due to the alteration of the state of its living body or, rather, to a 
real change in the world, would not be able to constitute a stable reality.17 The 
transcendental necessity of a coordination between the living body and the 
external world18 does not rule out that there can be several such coordinations 
different from another. We can easily imagine a permanent alteration of our sense 
organs that would gradually establish a new normal and persistent style of 
perception, admitting, in turn, new types of anomalies. However, a certain normal 
(or “orthoesthetic” perceptual life) is necessary, precisely because it provides a 
reference frame for anomalies that are due to changes in the bodily (or 
environmental) conditions of perception.  
These last considerations naturally extend to the intersubjective constitution 
of the world, in which normality becomes necessary for the mutual correlation of 
the perceptual (and intellectual) life of different subjects, i.e., for them to co-
constitute the same world. The title of a text written between 1930 and 1931 
indicates the entire sense of this problematic: Apodictical structure of 
transcendental subjectivity. The problem of transcendental constitution of the 
world  from normality. A section of this manuscript entitled Characteristic of 
human normality deals with the problem of the phenomenological interpretation 
of sentences such as “I, while apperceiving the world, apperceive it as normal” and 
“I am normal”. Husserl asks: “What do they mean “phänomenologisch von innen 
gesehen”? Here is the answer: 
…I am in a surrounding world with human beings, who  “all, apart from individual 
exceptions” experience this world as the same and determined in the same way, 
and, accordingly, have it in certainty as experienceable and experienceable in 
identity for one another. The world – before science - means for me and for them 
all (in their open multiplicity, also generatively ‘openly infinite’) exactly this 
common world [Gemeinwelt], and, to be specific, nature… (Hua 15, p. 157) 
In this text, we find a clear formulation of what is means to “have a world” as a 
member of an open community that shares a normal perceptual life. The reference 
to “generativity” that is contains indicates that such community stretches through 
different generations of subjects sharing the same world. This community will 
admit, as subjects co-constituting the world, “deviant” members, such as children, 
pathological subjects, and, in a different way, animals too. These subjects do not 
share the same structure of normality. However, the community of “normal”, adult, 
 
17 Hua 13, p. 367. 
18 Hua 13, p. 263-264.  
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healthy human beings will set the norms also for their constitutive performances.  
The aforementioned text contains also the important reference to the 
prescientific character of the original form of this intersubjective experience of 
the world in the unitary flux of the life of a community. What is, instead, the role 
of normality with respect to the constitution of a world that is scientifically 
determined, i.e., ideally true in itself? It is at this stage that one must take into 
account the difference between two transcendentally fundamental senses of 
normality: the first (the one we have discussed so far) concerns the perceptual 
normality of an open community of human beings, the second the intellectual 
normality of the ideal community of all possible rational beings. The first 
corresponds to actual human beings that have a normal perceptual life, the 
second to the ideal community of all rational beings, no matter their physical 
make-up.  
The perceptual normality characterizing a given community of subjects is 
necessarily dependent on their contingent form of embodiment. The case of 
animals highlights the fact that different species perceive the world differently, 
but, less dramatically, also pathological human subjects, or subject in abnormal 
conditions, perceive differently. As Husserl explained in detail in Ideas II, this 
fact, under the guidance of the scientific ideal of objectivity, motivates the 
mathematization of the world and the substitution of the qualities perceived by 
the senses with properties defined exclusively in the terms of mathematical 
physics.19 The last stage of constitution referred to in the previous section, the 
properly theoretical one, takes place, thus, in virtue of the relativization of 
perceptual normality and, consequently, of the transformation of the world as 
experienced by a community of normal subjects into an appearance of the true 
world of theory. Such world, of course, can be shared by rational subjects only, 
and presupposes, thus, the notion of intellectual normality, which establishes 
norms for the constitution of objectivity that cannot be relativized to the 
contingent form of embodiment of the subjects in question.20 This ultimate layer 
of objectivity presupposes the universal validity of all a  priori disciplines that 
 
19 See Husserl, 1989, § 18. 
20 Intellectual normality is a fundamental transcendental notion at all levels of constitution including the 
prescientific one. This passage clearly illustrates it: «Soll eine Welt sein, sollen Subjekte selbst sein, 
für sich und miteinander sein, soll eine Zahlenwelt, sollen Wesenswahrheiten und Wesen selbst sein 
können usw., so muss es normale Subjektivität geben; ich gehe nicht nur überhaupt als unbestimmtes 
ego allem, was für mich ist, vorher, sondern als normales Vernunftsubjekt, und das ist nun das grosse 
Thema, es zu umschreiben.» (Hua 15, p. 36). See also (Zahavi, 2001, p. 98).  
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make possible the empirical science of nature, i.e., on the one hand, the 
ontology of nature, with all its sub-disciplines  concerning the  spatial, temporal 
and causal eidetic components of materiality, and, on the other, the formal 
disciplines belonging to the mathesis universalis, such as logic, mathematics, 
and the pure theory of probability. Any intellectually normal subject would be 
able, in principle, to grasp the truth of such disciplines.21 Genetically speaking, 
the first sense of normality is more fundamental: 
 
The first and universal normality is the one whereby transcendental 
intersubjectivity in general constitutes a world as a normal world of experience 
of normal humanity. (Hua 15, p. 155) 
 
Eventually, though, only the ideal of a shared intellectual normality can 
ground the universal community of all rational beings, i.e., those able to co-
constitute the world as a theoretical accomplishment. Husserl explicitly refers to 
this possibility of extending the concept of humanity beyond its finite, 
contingent sense. 
 
And eventually, if it were to turn out that ‘human beings’ live, for instance on 
Mars, and if we were able to find a way to get into a community of 
comprehension with them, then they would at once be ranked under the human 
“we”, which is the correlate of the world as the common world of us all.(Hua 15, 
p. 164) 
 
 Let us sum up the results of this overview of the transcendental significance 
of embodiment and normality. In Ideas I, the correlation between the world and 
transcendental consciousness was introduced, in an admittedly very sketchy way, 
as a static relation between an individual stream of Erlebnisse and the world of 
the natural attitude. The developments just outlined, instead, without 
contradicting those first results, present a much more complex picture of the 
transcendental subjectivity constituting the world, and, thus, of the 
transcendental correlation itself. If a result of Ideas I consisted in the claim that 
the existence of a world is unthinkable without a transcendental consciousness 
constituting it, now it appears that, out of transcendental necessity, the 
existence of a world is unthinkable without an open community of 
 
21 One should think of the universal validity of logic and mathematics to appreciate this point. Husserl’s 
critique of biologistic or psychologist accounts of logic and mathematics, which make the truths of such 
sciences species-dependent, rejoins his theory of constitution. 
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transcendental subjects that self-objectifies as a community of embodied 
rational beings, i.e., latu sensu, as humanity. This does not mean that the 
distinction between transcendental and empirical subjectivity and the absolute 
character of the former are abandoned, but only that a world can be constituted 
in my transcendental consciousness only if I constitute myself as a member of a 
community of co-constituting subjects, that, as such, must self-objectify as 
“humans”.  
A further crucial aspect that the analyses of Ideas I did not foreground is that 
a community of monads bears within itself the world in virtue of a genesis that 
implies a dynamic and historical dimension. The considerations on normality 
just presented suffice to illustrate this dimension of subjectivity, without in the 
least exhausting it. Once more, let us adopt a transcendental, regressive 
approach. For the “true world” to become the telos of scientific research, the 
community of transcendental subjects must have reached the stage of the 
universal rational normality, which, in turn, implies a perceptual normality that, 
instead, rests on the contingent structure of sensibility. In other words, 
transcendental intersubjectivity bears in itself the telos of the exact, scientific 
determination of the world, only in virtue of an internal developmental process: 
to the different layers of the constitution of the world, from the prescientific to 
the scientific one, there corresponds an inner history of constituting subjectivity. 
This final consideration on the relation between constitutive subjectivity and the 
telos of ultimate, objective, scientific knowledge leads us back to the question 
raised at the end of the previous section.   
 
4.  The transcendental necessity of the world history 
The elements recalled in the previous section can help us understand that the 
answer to our question results from the nature of the correlation between 
transcendental subjectivity and the world. Taking into account the role of 
embodiment and normality will show that such correlation implies much more 
than the simple interplay between actual and potential consciousness that is so 
often evoked while discussing Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Better, it will 
allow us to spell out in detail what the implications of the notion of potential 
consciousness for the constitution of the world are. Let us first recall what 
Husserl says in Ideas I about the existence of things that are not actually 
perceived:  
That the unperceived physical thing “is there” means rather that, from my 
   The Telos of Consciousness and the Telos of World History                       95 
 
actually present perceptions, with the actually appearing background field, 
possible and, moreover, continuously-harmoniously motivated perception-
sequences, with ever new fields of physical things (as unheeded backgrounds), 
lead to those concatenations of perceptions in which the physical thing in 
question would make its appearance and become seized upon.(Husserl, 1983, 
p. 99-100) 
What is not actually perceived belongs to the horizon of what is actually 
perceived and can become object of a direct experiential grasp by the 
progressive exploration of such horizon. As is often repeated, the 
transcendence of the world is transcendentally elucidated in terms of the 
distinction between actual and potential consciousness. Now, it is legitimate to 
imagine that such a formulation needs only to be slightly modified to take into 
account the past existence of objects that were never in fact perceived, and that 
no longer exist. Their existence meant that they could be perceived in the above 
described terms by an actually existing consciousness, or, alternatively, their 
past existence means that they could have been so perceived. Still, what can be 
said about the existence of things, and more generally, about the existence of the 
world before the appearance of any living organism able to perceive? How can 
we think of a moment in the past in which the universe was purely material? 
This question is discussed by Husserl in some detail in a dense text written 
between 1914-15, i.e., shortly after the publication of the first volume of Ideas. 
We can sum up the conclusions of his analysis with the aid of the results of the 
previous section. The starting point is the essential connection between real 
being and the possibility of the valid knowledge of it, which ultimately implies 
the possibility of experience. This means that the existence of real being implies 
the «… necessarily co-existence of a knowing subject or capable of knowledge» 
(Hua 36, p. 140). We have already seen that, once developed in detail, what 
follows from this is the transcendental necessity of an open community of 
embodied subjects. In this sense, a purely physical world seems to be impossible. 
However, Husserl adds that such knowing subject is not necessarily actually 
knowing, but only really capable of knowledge, and even more importantly: 
«Neither is such subject required for the whole infinite time of existence of the 
world» (Hua 36, p. 140). Rather: 
A purely material world as lower stage and as initial period of the duration of 
the world satisfies the conditions of knowability, if there exists a subjectivity, 
which in a rational way through experience and thought constitutes this world, 
which is its present environment, and then in a rational way can construct 
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backward the earlier periods of the world, and also (among those) a period of 
purely material nature.(Hua 36, p. 141)22 
In light of the results of the preceding section, we can appreciate that this 
reference to a “rational” constitution effected through experience and thought 
is a scientific, theoretical kind of constitution, the only one thinkable when we 
speak about stages of the universe so far back in the past, before the appearance 
of any form of life. Furthermore, the only meaningful truth of such a world is the 
one expressed in the terms of theoretical knowledge. This implies, thus, not only 
that a material universe in which subjectivity never arises is unthinkable, but also 
that a universe in which rational subjectivity never arises is, likewise, 
unthinkable. No universe in which the evolution of life stops before the 
emergence of rational beings is conceivable, and the progressive development 
of: «… more and more differentiated living-bodies, a higher and higher 
developed central nervous system, higher and higher developed sense organs 
etc…» (Hua 36, p. 144) is a transcendental necessity: 
This development would have to be a necessary, definite development, and its 
goal would have to be reached and really achieved up to the point that a world is 
phenomenally constituted. This is necessary for one to be able to speak of a 
world at all. (Hua 36, p. 144) 
Likewise, no world could exist in which the only existing subjects are 
irrational in the way in which insane humans are.23 Husserl concludes: 
We necessarily have as correlate of an existing world a world-development, 
namely in the language of the absolute attitude: development of an open and yet 
not arbitrary multiplicity of subjects in accord with one another towards a level 
of development in which “normal” rational subjects emerge, who constitute the 
 
22 See also further: «Sind Subjekte soweit entwickelt, dass sie empirische Anschauung einer Welt und 
einer psychophysischen Gemeinschaftswelt haben, dann kann man eine vormenschliche Vergangenheit 
der Natur sich vorstellen und monadologisch interpretieren.» (Hua 36, p. 43). In this study, I will not 
explore the sense of the “monadological” interpretation mentioned here. Let us notice, in passing, that 
along these lines one can formulate a phenomenological answer to what Quintin Meillassoux has called 
the “problem of ancestrality” (Meillassoux, 2006, p. 13-49). An outline of such an answer is in (Zahavi, 
2017, p. 199-204).  
23 «Eine räumlich-zeitliche Welt mit bloß psychischen Wesen ist sehr wohl möglich, aber nur möglich 
als Unterstufe derselben Welt mit auftretenden Vernunftwesen. Ebenso: Eine Naturwelt mit 
unvernünftigen Wesen der Art, wie es Verrückte sind, ist nur möglich, wenn die Unvernünftigen in 
jener uns vertrauten unvollkommenen Gemeinschaft mit vernünftigen Wesen auftreten, die diese 
Unvernünftigen in die Welt einordnen können. Also die Welt bezogen auf notwendig normale 
Subjekte» (Hua 36, p. 144). 
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world in a rational way. This stage must really be reached, for one to be able to 
speak rightfully of the existence of the world. (Hua 36, p. 145) 
The transcendental necessity of this evolution does not only have a natural, 
phylogenetic component, but also a properly historical, cultural one, that is it 
concerns also the cultural part of the world history. In a text written in 1921, 
after reasserting the transcendental correlation between the world and a 
“normal humanity” and the necessity of an evolution that from lower organisms 
leads to humankind, Husserl concludes: 
Subjectivity is absolute, but it has in itself its absolute development, and the 
necessity of possible knowledge means, given that the present is not all, but it 
is the present of pasts, only this, that the flow of development must lead to 
mankind and to science (to culture). The world can only be if it develops 
constitutively, if absolute subjectivity develops the world, so that it develops to 
self-consciousness in human form, and further develops to scientific self-
consciousness. Without tendency to truth there is no truth, without 
development to knowledge there is no true being. (Hua 14, p. 136) 
These considerations, which point to the inclusion of cultural history in the 
necessarily historical development that is the correlate of a true existing world 
can be better understood by reflecting on the relation existing between 
normality, horizon, and constitution. To each stage of conscious life, whether 
animal of human, there corresponds a possibility of constitution that is relative 
to kind of normality characterizing that stage. Each normal community of 
experiencing subjects has its horizon of potential experience that determines 
what its objective correlate is. However, not all such horizons are so structured 
that they can “bear” within themselves the world, intended as the telos of an 
objective determination. A community of animals share an Umwelt, relative to 
its experiential performances, to which a certain species-relative truth 
corresponds, but not a world in the full sense of the word. This is why any such 
community can only be considered as a lower stage of a community of human-
like subjects. In other words, not all forms of experiencing subjectivities share 
horizons harboring a world capable of being objectively determined. 
Furthermore, a radical transformation of the human horizon itself occurs with 
the emergence of a mature, “European” scientific culture. A text written in 
1926 clearly highlights this point. In it, Husserl characterizes the development 
of a scientific humanity endowed with technical means of observation such as 
microscopes and telescopes, as the establishment of a new form of normality that 
acts as a norm for any preceding stage of the evolution of humanity. The 
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perceptual Umwelt of the prescientific humanity is thus relativized to the new 
level of “normal experience” proper to a community endowed with such 
instruments. This transformation marks a fundamental break in this 
developmental process, because a scientific culture lives in the awareness that 
each stage of the scientific progress is only a provisional one, and that the way in 
which the world appears at a certain stage of scientific and technological 
development will be superseded at a later stage, when new norms for truth will 
be available. The upshot of this process is that, for a scientific culture, there 
arises the idea of a true world that lies at the infinitely distant endpoint of 
scientific progress: «The one true world becomes the pole of endless series of 
approximations of relatively true worlds» (Hua 39, p. 659). To the development 
of scientific humanity, thus, there corresponds not just the emergence of new 
horizons of potential “experience”, but also the inception of a new 
developmental process of transformation of such horizons, a process that 
redefines the very sense of the being of the world. The sense in which the 
existence of a world necessarily implies a potential consciousness appears now 
in a new light. This potentiality is such that the world can only exist if it contains 
in itself a development leading to the emergence of a scientific consciousness. 
  
5. Conclusions 
We can now go back to the teleological considerations that Husserl develops in 
§ 58 of Ideas I. In that section, Husserl had exposed two series of motives that 
point towards a teleological consideration of the world, the teleology inbuilt into 
the intentional structure of consciousness, that ultimately leads to the telos of 
the scientific determination of the world, and the teleology manifested by what 
we have called the world history. It is this second type of teleology that seems to 
conflict with the standard interpretation of the scientific account of such a 
history, according to which the emergence of conscious life and, ultimately, of 
mankind was not in the least necessary. As anticipated, the first teleology, the 
teleology of consciousness, provides the key to understand the second. By 
taking into account the transcendental role of embodiment, intersubjectivity, 
normality, and cultural evolution, it has been highlighted that Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism prescribes a necessary correlation between objective 
truth conceived as the infinitely distant end point of scientific progress 
(teleologically orienting the life of consciousness), and a history of subjectivity 
that from inanimate matter must lead to a scientific developed humanity. For 
such truth to exist as an ideal pole, as a telos, the world must contain the self-
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objectivation of an infinitely self-developing transcendental intersubjectivity in 
the form of a scientific culture. Let us try to understand the consequences of this 
result.  
The history of the universe could have been different in many ways, but it 
could not have been such that human life (conceived in the previously indicated 
broad sense) would have never arisen anywhere. What is the sense of this “could 
not”? The scientist who characterizes the world in terms of theories and 
nomological statements elaborate a framework that allows the formulation of an 
infinity of counterfactual statements. By simply varying the “initial conditions” 
(without, thus, considering universes in which different natural laws would hold) 
it is possible to formulate an infinity of counterfactual natural histories to which 
as many possible worlds correspond. Such alternative histories constitute a 
“counterfactual supplement” of the scientific description of the actually existing 
world that is, to be sure, deductively correct. In other words, there is no logical 
or physical reason to proclaim the impossibility in principle of such alternative 
worlds. One could also reformulate this fact by saying that, for the scientist who 
works in the natural attitude, the factually existing nature is only a particular case 
of an infinite family of possible natures parametrized by the contingent initial 
conditions of the history of the universe. Only a subset of such histories contains 
life, a smaller subset sentient life, and an even smaller human-like (i.e., rational) 
life. Now, Husserl’s claims about the a priori necessity governing the world 
history can be seen as a transcendental critique of these counterfactual scenarios. 
What does this mean? As is well known, Husserl often claims that the naturalistic 
attitude (i.e., the attitude characteristic of natural scientists) is one-sided, 
because it identifies nature with the totality of being, because it ignores the 
constitutive subject, because it ignores the possibility of taking up a 
personalistic attitude, etc. Here, however, we face another consequence that 
such attitude is extremely likely to imply: i.e., to apperceive humanity as a 
contingent fact in the world. This consequence is due to a one-sided, 
objectivistic, notion of possibility that neglects that the transcendental 
correlation sets specific limits to what can count as a possible world. In modal 
terms, in addition to the different types of logical necessity, physical necessity, 
and in addition to the necessity stemming from the a priori ontology of nature, 
we have to take into account the phenomenological or transcendental necessity 
deriving from the a priori of the correlation. Such a priori, to be sure, must also 
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takes priority over the others. 24  This does not mean in the least that 
transcendental phenomenology interferes with the theoretical development of 
natural sciences by setting a priori limitations to their findings or, worse, by 
forcing upon them some kind of alternative teleological explanatory principles. 
Husserl is persuaded that nature is a causally closed sphere entirely governed by 
physical laws. There is no empirical fact that cannot in principle be explained in 
terms of laws and initial conditions. The explanation of why, for instance, the 
first life forms emerged from the primordial ooze will avail itself exclusively of 
physical and chemical principles. In this respect, we appreciate the difference 
between Husserl’s transcendental approach and attempted teleological reforms 
of natural science such as Nagel’s, conducted from within the naturalistic 
framework of contemporary philosophy of mind. What the transcendental 
critique implies concerns the counterfactual supplement of scientific theories 
only, according to which, for instance, the universe could have remained forever 
purely material; but the resulting impossibility of such scenarios cannot play any 
role in the scientific explanation of natural phenomena. It would make no sense, 
for instance, to claim that a cosmic catastrophe (such as the explosion of a 
supernova) capable of making forever impossible the emergence of life did not 
happen because it could not happen “out of transcendental necessity”. The 
explanation why it did not happen must necessarily remain a causal-nomological 
one. Similar considerations apply to cultural history. Such history, according to 
Husserl, must be understood in terms of motivational explanatory principles, 
which will of course imply a counterfactual supplement requiring a 
transcendental critique. It is, indeed, all too easy to imagine that the conditions 
that led the development of “European” scientific humanity could have never 
obtained, or, once more, that the natural surrounding conditions could have 
been such that human history would end before reaching such a stage. Yet, once 
more, these counterfactual scenarios must be ruled out in light of the transcendental 
necessity stemming from the a priori of correlation. 
I believe that Husserl’s conclusion can be illustrated with the following analogy. 
While reading an autobiography (whether it is written in the first of or in the third 
person it does not matter here),  we know from the outset that the main character of 
the book will not die, no matter how dangerous the situations described in it are, for 
the simple fact that the such character is also the author of the book, the one who is 
reconstructing and narrating the story. Thus, we know that the child the author once 
 
24 As Ip Long Nin has rightly stressed after hearing the presentation of the first version of this paper at 
the 2018 edition of the Venice Summer School of Phenomenology. 
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was will for sure grow into an adult. We know that, for instance, while the author was 
serving under the army, no bullet could ever kill him, nor render him forever 
deprived of the intellectual faculties required to recount the events of his life. 
Likewise, no machination, no intention to take his life or to deprive him of his 
intelligence could eventually achieve its aim. The life as well as the mental capacities 
of the author are, so to speak, protected by a kind of a priori immunity. Yet, we do 
not take this necessity to provide the explanation of the trajectory of the bullets that 
missed their target, nor of the failure of the plots hatched by the author’s enemies. 
The events recounted in the narrative must be explained from within the narrative 
itself, with the causal and motivational resources existing in the world it describes. 
Of course, many alternative developments could be imagined, as long as they do not 
preclude the possibility that the protagonist will be able to relate them. Now, 
considered from the transcendental point of view, the world history can be likened 
to the autobiography of humankind, an autobiography that could have led to 
countless different histories, but to none in which the self-objectivation of 
transcendental subjectivity in the form of a mature rational humanity is absent, and, 
finally, an autobiography obeying to a transcendental necessity that does not 
interfere with the causal and motivational fabric of the world.   
These considerations pave the way to what Husserl calls the teleological 
worldview based on the reconsideration of the world in terms of values, and prepare 
the ground for it. To be sure, they help us see that the necessary correlation between 
truth and subjectivity that is at the basis of transcendental idealism implies a reversal 
of the modern worldview, according to which humanity is but a contingent 
emergence in a self-sufficient material universe. Resorting to Schopenhauer’s words, 
one can say that for Husserl too, humankind is the “bearer of the world”.25   
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